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Abstract: This discourse aims at a displacement of the object of critique of 
any future ‘critique of political economy’. The first part addresses the nature of 
critique in general and of ‘critique of political economy’ in particular which has 
traditionally been conceived as a critique of a mode of production in Marxian 
terms. The displacement of this object of critique - the mode of production 
- requires an understanding of the problem of the unity of this mode of 
production. The second part of our discourse addresses the problem of the 
money commodity, of credit and debt in relation to the unity of the mode of 
production. We deny, contrary to Marx, that money is a commodity and affirm 
instead the importance of a categorical analysis of credit and debt. Adducing an 
argument advanced by the Italian economist Augusto Graziani, we affirm that 
money is credit and debt in the initial phase of commodity production. The unity 
of the Marxian ‘mode of production’ comes to depend on credit and debt and 
thus a ‘mode of indebtment’ must be postulated. This consequence we name 
Lazzarato’s problem in honor of Maurizio Lazzarato. We finally affirm that any 
future ‘critique of political economy’ must address both the analysis and the 
treatment of Lazzarato’s problem. 
Keywords: credit and debt, mode of production, money, the indebted man, 
critique of political economy
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Introduction: The Dilemma of Debt for Any Future Critique of 
Political Economy
According to a certain recurrent opinion, we live in an age of debt. If this 
opinion is true then the treatment of the question of debt—that is, its nature 
and organization—is of central importance to politics in general. According to 
a second opinion, left-wing politics is essentially an activity of critique of the 
present state of affairs and its reproduction, for the sake of the overcoming of 
this state of affairs. One among the many objects of such critique is supposed to 
be the political economy.1 If this opinion is true there will be no serious left-wing 
politics without a critique of political economy. This raises the question of how 
the importance of debt and of critique are related. 
 According to a third opinion, the critique of political economy draws its 
main inspiration from the Marxian tradition. This opinion appears to be grounded 
in the fact that only the Marxian tradition provides a kind of critique, which 
aims at the whole of the economic organization of a given social formation. The 
object of critique in the Marxian tradition is the so-called ‘mode of production’. 
Yet the question of debt is absent from most of Marxian thought regarding the 
analysis and critique of the political economy. Consider then the following three 
propositions which form a dilemma for any contemporary critique of political 
economy: 1) The Marxian notion of a ‘critique of political economy’, both as a 
scientific and as a political critique, intends to be a critique of a specific ‘mode 
of production’, namely the ‘capitalist’ mode of production. 2) Marx’s analysis of 
capitalism does not consider the relationship of ‘debt’—and debt is a relation 
or relationship between two parties, not an entity or a property of an entity—
understood as a legal duty denominated in units of ‘money’, to be fundamental 
to the unity of the capitalist mode of production itself. 3) Any analysis of the 
current mode of production without an analysis of the relationship of debt as 
an essential part is insufficient.2 Hence it follows 4) that the Marxian notion 
of a ‘critique of political economy’ is insufficient for at least the critique of 
the contemporary variety of the capitalist mode of production, or as some 
people like to say: of Neoliberalism. If you affirm the proposition—for whatever 
reason and regardless of whether you consider yourself a Marxist or not—that 
reading and re-reading Marx for the sake of his critique of political economy 
is a meaningful task today and if you also affirm the proposition that debt is 
not merely a derivative phenomenon within the capitalist mode of production, 
but instead is fundamental to its unity and reproduction, your affirmations are 
in conflict with each other. For it makes no sense to simply re-read Marx for 
the sake of applying his ‘critique of political economy’ to our own time and 
circumstances, if this critique is fundamentally flawed in one respect essential 
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to contemporary political matters. You might then consider either abandoning 
the idea of a ‘mode of production’ altogether and focus on the analysis of 
debt alone, and therewith giving up the notion of critique related to the total 
economic organization of a given social formation, or you might likewise 
abandon the notion of debt as fundamental and return to a more orthodox 
Marxist view of economic relations.3
 If one deems both these alternatives to be unsatisfactory, as indeed the 
author of this text does, there appears to be only one choice left: One has to 
re-conceive the notion of ‘critique of political economy’—and thus, the notion of 
the mode of production as its object of critique—in order to face the problem of 
debt as being fundamental to the object of this critique. This raises the following 
question: How must we conceive of the critique of political economy in such 
circumstances as the present, in an age of debt? More precisely: How must we 
conceive of the act of critique as a political act and how must we conceive of 
its object if the relationship of debt is to be an essential part of such critique? 
The following discourse is an attempt to respond to this question.4 Its aim is to 
determine anew, by undertaking what we shall term a ‘displacement’, what might 
be intended here and now by the term ‘critique of political economy’. As debt 
will be understood throughout our discourse as a legal duty denominated in 
units of ‘money’, the relation of debt invokes questions concerning the nature of 
law, of money and of the state. In the first part we shall deal with the notion of 
critique, while in the second part we shall discuss matters relating to its object of 
critique. 
1. On the Nature of Critique (of Political Economy) – its Power, its 
Act, its Aim
1.1 We are then attempting to re-determine, or to call into question at the very 
least, what Louis Althusser might have termed the ‘theoretical object’ of Marx’s 
discourse on political economy in one particular respect, namely insofar as this 
object is related to the act of critique.5 Hence we put into question the very 
meaning of this act of critique. The name of ‘Marx’ certainly remains the most 
important referent for the ‘critique of political economy’ today, precisely because 
his name marks the origin of a specific kind of critique aiming at the entire 
economic organization of a given social formation. As a re-determination is also 
a kind of repetition, it cannot possibly pretend to get rid altogether of that which 
it re-determines. In particular, even though re-determining the object of such 
critique, the form of critique will be preserved. Yet, given the dilemma outlined 
above, we have to accept that the mere invocation of the name ‘Marx’ will not 
resuscitate the possibility of critique. Such invocations are today recurrent and 
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without lasting effect. Hence a reinvestigation of some of the fundamental 
categories of Marxian critique becomes necessary. 
 A re-determination of what the term ‘critique of political economy’ is 
supposed to mean or signify is therefore not a simple linguistic matter, but rather 
a philosophical investigation of the primary intention of the term, that is: the 
essence of the object related to its act of designation—if it designates anything 
at all. Such a re-determination becomes necessary not through mere intellectual 
curiosity alone, but through a twofold political necessity—both of prudence 
and duty. The political philosopher, whose task is partially comprised within 
the undertaking of this re-determination, is bound to these necessities alike, 
for his role is both to be a discoverer of what is prudent and to be a teacher of 
duty—what is owed, in accordance with prudence—such that the expedient and 
the just do not find themselves divided. One might be tempted to say that a 
crisis of debt occurs when it ceases to be prudent to pay back the debt, given 
that this holds true not just in a particular case—where it is always prudent, 
but always against duty—but generally. A crisis of debt occurs when the duty 
to pay back one’s debt—which is universally valid for everyone—becomes a 
matter of the highest political imprudence. We shall say that the aforementioned 
twofold necessity is imposed on us by the political urgency grounded in the loss 
of any effective ‘critique of political economy’. We thereby mean that the re-
determination is both prudent and will have been obligatory. The diagnosis from 
which we begin necessitates the task that lies ahead. 
1.2 All who consider the present global economic situation will come to 
know at some point that this configuration is firstly, intrinsically unstable—in 
particular due to the overhang of private debt that has accumulated and still 
is accumulating within the global economy. And that secondly, if this situation 
is left on its own, that is, in the absence of political action, its destructive 
tendencies might lead only to catastrophic results, destabilizing the present 
configuration of political communities among men without providing any 
refuge to those who will have to undergo exodus. The present global state 
of economic relations has the potential to realize what Alain Badiou names 
an ‘obscure disaster’, particularly obscure for both the lack of insight into its 
governing causes and the lack of any new subjective engagement contrary to 
these tendencies.6 Appropriating Althusser’s notion of ‘conjuncture’ for this 
problem,7 one might say that an obscure disaster is the effect of a conjuncture of 
several processes—economic, social, ideological, hence political or whatever one 
desires to name it—that has the combined power of dissolving the prior effects 
of an earlier political subjectivity, yet without the substitution of a new political 
subjectivity in its place. An obscure disaster therefore has the power to dissolve 
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any existing political order and community, yet without providing any alternate, 
new articulation of political subjectivity and new effects of political unification 
and organization. Should any new political subjectivity be conceivable—which 
is not itself an obscure reaction to a potential obscure disaster—it must include 
a critique of the governing causes of the present situation. It is here that the 
absence of any effective critique of political economy becomes a political 
problem. 
 Aristotle said aptly that political animals—among which prominently 
figures ‘man’—are those gregarious animals to which a ‘common work’ 
‘occurs’.8 Averroes, the great Arabic commentator of Aristotle from al-Andalus, 
in his Commentary on Plato’s Republic, made us aware of the fact that such 
occurrences and their goodness are in no way safeguarded by what is commonly 
known as the Aristotelian view of man as political animal.9 The political nature 
of man is without much resource to do good in the absence of the intervention 
of the political art. Such art being required, a political intervention must be 
constructed. We shall say that an ‘obscure disaster’ is to be defined in these 
terms as the un-occurrence of a prior common work without any alternate 
occurrence of a new common work for a specific group of men. On the one hand 
such un-occurrences are necessary, as no human affair and hence no occurrence 
of a common work to a political animal can be perpetually in-act, as Aristotle 
would say. But the un-occurrence without a new occurrence of a ‘common 
work’ leaves the disorganized multitude in the political limbo of what the Greeks 
called ‘stasis’.10 It is this that is signified by ‘the potential for an obscure disaster’. 
Prudence dictates that obscure disasters are to be avoided. Duty will have 
commanded that the affirmation of new political order is to be preferred to the 
affirmation of an obscure disaster.
 
1.3 Considering these circumstances let us all remember that the term ‘critique of 
political economy’ used to have a meaning which, at least to our minds, appears 
in retrospect to have once been clear and distinct. For it was tied to the political 
history of Marxism, in particular to the effects generated by October Revolution. 
Yet we are now entirely in oblivion what that meaning used to be. For the 
political history of Marxism has come to an end. Marxism can no longer aspire, 
without comic relief, to any sort of world-historical pretension. This comic relief 
buries the earlier nobility of its cause. This loss of the meaning of critique, tied 
to the end of Marxism as a political force, can be discerned from the fact that 
the kind of critique, which has had ‘political economy’ as its object, has become 
powerless. By this we mean that the act of critique of the political economy does 
no longer necessitate political concern.
 If the loss of the power of critique means that the act of critique need not 
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concern anyone any longer, critique appears to be powerful insofar as it can 
necessitate such concern. The blade of the sword of critique is sharped by the 
power of necessitation.11 The difference we remember is situated here: that the 
critique used to have a power which is now absent, that what critique meant 
was to have that power which is now lost. The possibility of critique depends 
on this power. The loss of meaning of the term ‘critique of political economy’ 
is therefore intimately related to the loss of power of that very critique. By the 
‘meaning’ of critique we mean therefore that whatever the act of critique has 
had the power to necessitate the concern for. The reason for this appears to be 
that a critique without power to necessitate concern is politically meaningless. 
Such a critique is not political at all, but simply an individual stance for or against 
something, a stance without any necessary relation to its object, nor to the 
actions and opinions of someone else. But it appears the relation of critique 
to its object used to be necessary, for we do in fact remember it to have been 
so. The meaning of critique that we remember then lies in this merely formal 
necessitation of concern. The critique of political economy used to necessitate 
the concern of certain people. It has ceased to do so. 
 Hence the question arises about the nature of the power of critique and 
its contemporary role—if regaining it is at all supposed to be possible. What we 
aim at, then, is to understand the meaning of, or the possibility underlying, the 
critique of political economy. By ‘understanding’ we mean the re-determination 
of that power in thinking its object. Regaining the power of critique is therefore 
an act of understanding necessitated by prudence, which results, in our case, 
in a displacement of the object of critique. Yet whether such a displacement 
within philosophy will have been successful to actually necessitate anything 
or not, is entirely dependent on something outside of the act of philosophy—
namely: on the art of politics. For philosophy is here the thinking of the power of 
critique, not its actuation. Philosophy it is in no way a critique of critique as the 
exercise of a power to powers. Hence it does not have any power of its own to 
necessitate anything at all to someone else—except to itself.
  
1.4 We shall say that the act of critique is characterized by an agent, a primary 
and a secondary aim as well as two objects with a power related to each object. 
All these respects are related to one another in the act of critique. The act of 
critique is directed against agents of actions and opinions exemplifying the 
power of the object of critique. The power of the object of critique consists in 
the possibility of the repetition of the exemplification of actions and opinions 
of a certain type deriving their possibility from that power. The primary aim of 
critique is the interruption of the power of the object of critique by means of 
the interdiction of the repetition of this exemplification of actions and opinions 
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presumed to be authorized by the object’s power. The secondary aim of critique 
is to necessitate the exemplification of the power of an alternate object that we 
shall call the object of glorification.12 The object of critique therefore is twofold: it 
consists in actions and opinions and in the power to exemplify such actions and 
opinions—it has an actual and a possible respect to it, for it is both an actuality 
and a power. Likewise for the object of glorification. The act of critique mediates 
between these two twofold objects: the object of critique and the object of 
glorification. The whole problem of critique is contained in this mediation, as the 
negative side of critique does not necessarily entail a determinate affirmation 
of any specific object of glorification. In fact, a critique that is purely negative—
insofar as it does not decide on any object of glorification—is an expression of 
a fundamental weakness, of a disorientation of the secondary aim of critique. 
Nonetheless, we shall confine ourselves to the object of critique, for this is what 
critique is ‘of’ or ‘about’ in the more immediate and primary sense. 
 
1.5 The traditional political left names the repeated exemplification of the 
power of its object of critique in action and opinion the ‘reproduction’ of the 
object. In this way leftist activism speaks of the ‘reproduction’ of ‘capitalism’ 
or ‘sexism’ or ‘racism’—or any other object of critique the leftist activist 
might imagine as being worthy of critique. It is clear that the political left has 
been, and to a certain degree still is, even apart from the discovery of many 
repressed ‘identities’ to concern oneself with, occupied with a critique of 
‘capitalism’. Capitalism was traditionally understood (if it was understood at 
all) in the terminology of Marx as a certain ‘historico-specific’ and ‘social’ unity 
of the ‘relations of production’ and ‘forces of production’ of a given society—
in short: as a ‘mode of production’. Louis Althusser, in the second part of his 
work On Reproduction, emphasizes the problem of this unity of the ‘relations 
of production’ and the ‘forces of production’ within Marxist thought.13 The 
philosophical question that arises immediately is of what kind of ‘unity’ we are 
speaking when the Marxist claims that the mode of production is a unity of 
the forces of production and the relations of production? Specifically, what is 
the nature of this unity and what is the cause of its unification? This is a very 
important question indeed, for it lies at the heart of the understanding we aim at: 
the re-determination of the object of critique. The Marxist notion of a critique of 
political economy is the critique of a certain ‘mode of production’, in particular 
the interruption of the ‘capitalist mode of production’ and the initiation of 
some other ‘mode of production’, sometimes called ‘Socialism’, sometimes 
‘Communism’.14 The problem of the unity and unification of the object of critique 
therefore arises as the central problem of the critique of political economy. And 
this object of critique is the ‘mode of production’. As we shall see now, it is an 
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object not without its problems.
 
2. The Money-Commodity as Fundamental Problem of Marx’s 
Critique of Political Economy: From the ‘Mode of Production’ to the 
‘Mode of Indebtment’
2.1 The fundamental problem of the Marxist conception of a critique of political 
economy is contained implicitly within the logical relations between some 
of its most basic categories determining its object and aim of critique. By a 
‘category’ of something we shall mean, in this context of discussing Marxism 
and its categories, the determination of what it is to be that thing for any thing 
whatsoever of a certain kind. A category predicates of any thing what kind of 
thing that thing is, in case the thing falls under the respective category of being 
of this kind. This means that whatever that thing is, one cannot conceive of it as 
that thing, under the abstraction of the predication of its categories. The term 
‘category’ is then not used in the Aristotelian sense of ‘category’ as in the nine 
non-substantial categories or predicables—quality, quantity, place and so on—
but rather exclusively in the Aristotelian sense of substance or essence, or of 
what Aristotle calls ‘ousía’. Nonetheless, it is important to speak of categories 
here because this term is well established within Marxist discourse, on the one 
hand by Marx himself, on the other hand by interpreters of Marx’s works, even 
those who are as much in opposition as Louis Althusser and Enrique Dussel. 
In the sense that Althusser, for instance, uses ‘category’, such predications 
of categories of course depend—in particular in its interpellative nature—on 
Althusser’s larger project and is not our direct concern here. In Althusser this use 
of ‘category’ is clearly evident in the case of the ‘category of the subject’ in his 
work on ideology, as when saying in Althusserian language, that for someone 
to be a subject is for them ‘to be interpellated by ideology’.15 This clearly is 
a determination of that what it is to be a subject according to Althusser. A 
category is then taken in the sense of Aristotle’s ‘ousía’, as in saying that the 
‘ousía’ of X is the answer to the question ‘what it is to be X for some thing’.
 
2.2 One surprising thing to note about Marxian predications of categories in the 
context of Marx’ Capital is that while in general that what it is to be for a thing 
might either be intrinsic to that thing or relational to other things—things might 
have relational or intrinsic essences or a combination of both—all categories 
analysed by Marx in Capital appear to be relational. The reason for this is that 
Marx only considers categories that are predicated of ‘social’ relations in respect 
to ‘man’. All categories analysed in Capital such as ‘labour-power’, ‘labour’ (as 
opposed to ‘work’), ‘commodity’ or ‘money’ or ‘value’ (as opposed to ‘worth’) 
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are of this kind. They are all predicated of social relations of human beings or of 
things. One might then have expected to find first and foremost an analysis of 
the categories of ‘society’ and ‘history’ or of the predication ‘social’ itself, so as 
to make clear what it means for ‘man’—and hence for any human being—to be 
social, but such an analysis is strikingly absent from Marx’s Capital. The category 
of the ‘social’ or ‘society’ is rather presupposed within the analysis of all other 
categories. This presupposition itself poses a problem.16
 In order to become aware of this problem, we shall consider the Marxian 
categories of ‘mode of production’, of ‘commodity’, of ‘money’, of ‘law’ and 
the implicit problem of the category of ‘credit’—and hence of ‘debt’—within his 
discussion of the ‘credit system’. Considering their mutual relations, one realizes 
quickly that there is a hierarchy of these categories implicitly—and sometimes 
also explicitly—presupposed in the analysis. It appears that there is a tendency 
of decreasing generality, beginning with the category of ‘history’, proceeding 
via ‘society’ and ‘mode of production’ to the properly economic categories of 
‘commodity’, the ‘exchange of commodities’, subsequently ‘money’ and finally 
‘credit’. Let us consider the example of the category of ‘money’ to make clear 
what the consequence of this is: Whenever we predicate of something that it 
is money, we also predicate all the higher categories of it, such as ‘being under 
certain historical conditions’, ‘being in some society’ or ‘being in some mode 
of production’ and ‘being commodity’ as well as ‘being exchangeable for other 
commodities’. Anything that is money will also be all these other things. Hence 
it follows that in the analysis of the category of ‘money’, in giving the answer 
to the question ‘what is it for X to be money?’, we will inevitably encounter the 
category of ‘commodity’. The answer to the question what is it for some thing to 
be money? includes that it is a commodity, exchangeable for other commodities, 
within a given mode of production belonging to a given society under given 
historical conditions. 
 
2.3 We now see the centrality of Marx’s notion of a ‘mode of production’ in a 
given society for his analysis. For all economic categories are being predicated 
only under a certain ‘mode of production’ within the confines of Marxian 
analysis. This idea is so central to the whole edifice of Marxian economic analysis 
that Marx’s Capital begins not simply with an analysis of ‘commodity’, but 
with an analysis of ‘commodity’ within a certain dominant or prevailing ‘mode 
of production’ which he terms ‘capitalist’.17 As ‘capitalism’ in this sense is the 
object of critique for the critique of political economy in its political sense, it is 
obvious that these logical relations are of the utmost importance for our task 
of re-determining the object of critique. Within Marxian analysis, the category 
of ‘mode of production’ is taken to be always logically prior to the category 
439
CONTINENTAL THOUGHT & THEORY: A JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM 
Volume 1, Issue 2: Debt and Value
of ‘commodity’ or, for that matter, to any other economic category. Hence the 
analysis of the latter categories is always predicated in relation to a ‘mode of 
production’ in a given ‘society’. For any Marxian theorist it therefore holds true 
that he or she predicates ‘commodity’ of something if and only if he or she also 
predicates it in relation to a ‘mode of production’ within a ‘society’ under certain 
‘historical’ conditions. This logical conditioning defines the properly ‘materialist’ 
character of Marxian analysis. Marxian theorists will reject any analysis of 
economic categories as quasi-eternal, for they believe this to contain a logical 
error, a ‘category mistake’ as one might say. For the Marxists, ‘history’ is the only 
object representable as eternal, for ‘historical’ is said of all things according to 
them.
 Marx’s vision of a critique of political economy as elaborated in Capital is 
grounded in the aforementioned methodology of logical abstractions. It aims 
at laying bare the basic categories of the capitalist mode of production and its 
reproduction. His scientific analysis, understood in this sense, is to reproduce 
in thinking the basic structure of social reality in the framework of categories it 
explicates. Hence the hierarchy of categories is supposed to make transparent 
the structure of the capitalist ‘mode of production’ as its object of analysis, as 
well as its object of critique. The analysis of the ‘capitalist mode of production’ 
is therefore immediately linked to the political power of critique of ‘capitalism’ 
as a case of the critique of political economy, for the act of critique aims at 
interdicting the reproduction of its object. Hence the question of the prudential 
status of the analysis has an immediate political impact, for it will determine the 
essence of the act of critique of political economy by determining the logical 
structure of its object directly as well as its aim indirectly. 
 
2.4 We mentioned earlier that the central issue we shall investigate is that of the 
unity and unification of the ‘mode of production’. What, then, is the problem of 
the unity and unification of the ‘mode of production’? It is problem of how the 
two elements, the forces of production and the relations of production come to 
adhere together and in which way this adherence is to be analysed categorically. 
As we shall see in a moment, the problem of the unity of the ‘mode of 
production’ in buried underneath the problem of the relationship of the outmost 
categories of the hierarchy of properly economic categories stated above: that 
of ‘mode of production’ and that of ‘credit’, of ‘law’ and the ‘state’.18 To see why 
there is a somewhat strange thing going on within the Marxian hierarchy of 
categories, a kind of refoulement of the problem of ‘credit’ and of ‘law’—and 
hence of ‘debt—as one might say in psychoanalytic terms, consider the strange 
absence of any meaningful analysis of ‘credit’ as an independent economic 
category within Marx’s Capital. Why then is there an attempt to derive ‘money’ 
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from ‘commodity’, but not ‘credit’ from ‘money’?19 Why does Marx start with an 
analysis of ‘commodity’ to begin with, and not with an analysis of anything else? 
Granted, the category of credit may not have appeared as significant as it does 
today, in a world—particularly in a Europe—drowning in debt. Yet the analysis 
of the credit system that Marx had undertaken for the third volume of Capital 
still considers relations of credit. In spite of these considerations there is, strictly 
speaking, no analysis of the category of ‘credit’ within the Marxian framework, 
except for these elucidations on the ‘credit system’ in the manuscripts which 
became the third volume of Capital. But these are considerations of a more 
practical and therefore less logical character.
 
2.5 Credit, if taken only in its narrow economic sense, is always denominated in 
the units of a specific currency, and hence in terms of money. Consider further 
that for every unit of monetary credit there must be some unit of debt (for 
the sum of all loans and deposits is always zero). The category of ‘credit’—
should one wish to attempt its analysis within the Marxian framework itself— 
presupposes an analysis of the category of ‘debt’. Hence it is striking that the 
latter is even more absent from the writings of Marx than the former.
 Are we not missing something very important here? So important, in 
fact, that the whole possibility of the critique of political economy depends 
on it? We shall argue that this is indeed the case, for the lack that the missing 
analysis leaves must be analysed as a twofold lack: as both a lack within the 
economic analysis of Marx and the political categories of critique. And to see 
why this lack is of such central importance consider the following problem: Is it 
possible to analyse the unity of the mode of production in abstraction of the law 
and of the indebtedness the law imposes on its subjects within the relations of 
production? We shall present a case for the proposition that this is not so. The 
reason we shall give is that money is fundamentally credit and not a commodity 
like any other. If our case is well presented it will have become clear that it is 
likewise impossible to understand the category of the ‘mode of production’ 
without reference to ‘law’ and ‘debt’. The consequence of this finding for Marxian 
economic and political thinking could hardly be more radical. Might one not 
rather be forced to speak of a ‘mode of indebtment’ as being presupposed 
by a ‘mode of production’? The ultimate consequence of this is perhaps that 
the character of Marxian analysis as ‘social’ and ‘historical’ must be called into 
question.
 
2.6 Our thought that debt is central to both politics and economics, taken 
on its own, is hardly innovative. We shall here give at least nominal credit to 
some of the people who have worked on this subject. A detailed discussion is 
441
CONTINENTAL THOUGHT & THEORY: A JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM 
Volume 1, Issue 2: Debt and Value
not possible in this context; neither does it contribute to our argumentative 
end. Nonetheless these authors will have to be taken into account, should one 
wish to make our claim more concrete and to analyse the actual relations of 
indebtedness.
 Concerning the political dimension of debt, the category has seen certain 
resurgence in recent years, particularly in the aftermath of the financial crisis 
of 2007. This is clear to those familiar with the works of Giorgio Agamben, in 
particular his recent publication Opus Dei attempting an archeology of ‘duty’ 
(and hence, of ‘debt’) or Maurizio Lazzarato’s enlightening essay on The Making 
of the Indebted Man. Both authors are of course themselves ‘indebted’—if 
one is permitted to say so in this context—to work of Michel Foucault and 
Gilles Deleuze, works which in their turn relate backwards to Nietzsche’s 
Genealogy of Morals. On the other hand we have authors related to the narrower 
economic problem of money, credit and debt in the largest possible sense who 
emphasized that money is basically a relation of credit and debt. One peculiarly 
prominent proponent of this view has been the anthropologist David Graeber. 
Other authors include many heterodox economists, in particular those related 
to the so-called Post-Keynesian strand of economic thought—working under 
such headings as ‘Chartalism’, ‘Modern Monetary Theory’ or ‘endogenous 
money’—but also sociologists of money such as Geoffrey Ingham. We shall 
name some of these economists, undertaking such close analysis without any 
further discussion of most of their work: A. Mitchel Innes, Friedrich Georg 
Knapp, J.M. Keynes, Abba P. Lerner, Hyman Minsky, Michael Hudson, Basil Moore, 
Wynne Godley, Randal Wray, Marc Lavoie, Stephen Keen or Augusto Graziani.20 
Particularly the last in line, the late Italian economist Augusto Graziani, has 
developed an argument, closely related to the question of a money commodity 
and the commodity nature of money in Marx’s own theory, which is of the 
highest interest to us. For what we shall claim is that contrary to the classical 
Marxist view, the category of ‘credit’ does not depend on the category of ‘mode 
of production’ within a ‘society’ but that the category of ‘mode of production’ 
depends on relations of credit and debt because of the non-commodity credit 
nature of money in the acquisition of labour power. In order to better understand 
this, we shall examine what we call Graziani’s argument.
 
2.7 Let us therefore return to the problem of the unification of the ‘mode of 
production’, that is of the ‘means of production’ and the ‘relations of production’. 
Michael Heinrich has made an interesting observation in a recent article of his, 
namely that the realization of surplus-value in Marx’s theory beyond the initial 
amount of constant and variable capital c + v depends on the credit system.21 
We shall agree with Heinrich’s statement, both in the context of Marx’s analyses, 
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as well as more broadly. But we shall now ask the following question: Is it only 
in the realization of surplus-value or also in the production of commodities for 
which the credit system is a necessary presupposition? The question is whether 
the capital advanced as c + v for the initial production is also made possible 
by a relation of credit and not only the amount of money beyond c + v in the 
realization of surplus value. That the former is indeed the case is the point of 
what was introduced as Graziani’s argument.
 What exactly is Graziani’s claim and which argument does he advance for 
it? Firstly, Graziani assumes that Marxian analysis concerns a cyclical process of 
production composed of the following five stages: 1) the initial money, 2) the 
purchase of labour power, 3) the utilization of labour power in production, 4) 
the finished product and 5) the sale of the production on the market. In this he 
follows loosely the cycle M – C … P … C’ – M’ (where P represents the production 
process and C’ and M’ are commodity and money with surplus value added) as 
described by Marx. Heinrich’s claim was that the credit system is presupposed 
in the fifth stage of exchanging C’ for M’, insofar as the realization of surplus-
value exceeds the capital present in the initial stage—that is, what Graziani calls 
the ‘initial money’ added to the constant capital in Marx’s terms. Graziani then 
moves on to claim that “in the initial moment of exchange between money 
capital and labour power it seems impossible to define money as a commodity, 
and, moreover, seems impossible to avoid conceding to money the nature of 
pure credit”.22 This then is his claim: money is not a commodity and money, in 
the initial purchase of labour power, must be pure credit. In the first part of this 
claim he follows an earlier analysis of the problem of commodity money in Marx 
undertaken by Marcello Messori.23 That money cannot be a commodity in the 
initial stage of the production cycle, when the acquisition of labour power takes 
place, rests on a twofold consideration: 
The capitalist acquires labour power for the purpose of producing 
commodities; if money were itself a commodity, the process would 
seem to be turned upside down and the capitalist would employ a 
commodity for the purpose of acquiring labour power. Moreover, if 
money were a commodity, it would have to be the result of a prior 
productive process, which would in turn need money to be realized. 
If, therefore, money is to be construed as a commodity, one would 
have to assume, as an initial premise of the argument, the existence 
of a commodity that had the characteristics of money, without, 
however, being able to explain where it came from.24 
The point of the second part of his argument—that money must be credit—is 
443
CONTINENTAL THOUGHT & THEORY: A JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM 
Volume 1, Issue 2: Debt and Value
then made in a shorter form, when Graziani states that “at the ideal moment in 
which the production phase begins, since no commodity yet exists, commodity 
money cannot exist. Money must therefore be the purchasing power without 
being a commodity.”25 And ‘credit’ is the name that designates this purchasing 
power. Hence Graziani’s argument consists in a regress argument leading to the 
problem of the initial situation in which capitalist production originated.26 It ends 
in claiming that in its form as initial purchasing power, money has to be credit 
and credit alone. In contrast to the more conservative Marxian view that money 
presupposes commodities in circulation, Graziani claims that the production of 
commodities presupposes money as credit. When considering the genealogy of 
the capitalist production process it becomes clear that the category of ‘money’ 
must be logically prior to that of ‘commodity’. More so, insofar as Graziani 
believes that this implies that money, in the initial case of production, can only 
exist as purchasing power—that is, as credit and debt—the categories of ‘credit’ 
and ‘debt’ will be prior to that of ‘commodity’ as well.
 The most important consequence of this is of course that the category 
of the ‘mode of production’ thereby comes to presuppose the category of 
‘credit’ because the unification of the means of production and the relations 
of production—the labour-power being put to work for the production of 
commodities—is mediated by a credit relation from the beginning. The question 
which then must be raised is this: How does someone come to acquire this initial 
power to purchase labour-power in the first place? As Graziani emphasizes time 
and again: in order to acquire this purchasing power, the capitalist himself must 
go into debt—the acquisition of purchasing power as credit appears therefore 
to be the self-imposition of a duty to repay the debt one incurs.27 However, how 
can human labour come to be purchased in this initial situation? The purchasing 
power of money depends on there being a need for money of some kind. This 
need cannot be due to the famous ‘double freedom’ which Marx postulated, 
quite correctly, as a condition of the capitalist ‘mode of production’—namely 
the freedom to sell oneself to whomever one pleases, but also the freedom 
from the means of production. Selling one’s own labour power as a commodity 
for money under the condition of ‘double freedom’ already presupposes the 
existence of other things as commodities one can buy for money. As in Graziani’s 
argument no commodity yet exists, the reason for selling oneself cannot be that 
one desires to buy commodities for one’s own reproduction. Hence the ‘double 
freedom’ is certainly a condition of the reproduction of the capitalist ‘mode of 
production’, but is not sufficient to analyse the initial exchange of production. 
The other reason due to which one might have a need for money, in abstraction 
from the need to reproduce oneself by means of acquiring commodities through 
money, is that one is already indebted before the initial transaction of selling 
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one’s labour power. Which poses the problem of how this original indebtment 
comes about.28 
 If the argument advanced by Graziani has any sound basis at all this means 
that the ‘mode of production’ cannot be the ultimate object of critique, neither 
can it be ultimate object of economic analysis. We shall postulate instead that 
a ‘mode of indebtment’ must be the basis for the unification of the Marxian 
‘mode of production’. This ‘mode of indebtment’ is something both capital and 
labour power have to adhere to in order for production to even begin, let alone 
for the conditions of production to be reproduced. The analysis and critique 
of the fundamental question of the origin of this ‘mode of indebtment’, its 
production and reproduction, we shall name Lazzarato’s problem in honour of 
Maurizio Lazzarato who made us aware again of the nature of debt as a power 
relationship. The ‘mode of indebtment’ is, as one might say in his words, the 
“subjective engine of the modern-day economy”.29And one might surmise that 
this holds true not only for the modern-day economy, but perhaps much more 
generally than initially suspected.
1 By the term ‘object’ I do not intend to refer to the aim of critique, but to the   
 Gegenstand, nor to that which is effected or realized through the act of critique,  
 but to that against which the act of critique is directed. Hence the ‘object’ of   
 critique is whatever the critique is a critique of, i.e. the critique of capitalism, of  
 sexism, of atheism, of Epicureanism etc. 
2 This is the consequence of Maurizio Lazzarato’s central thesis: “Debt is not an   
 impediment to growth. Indeed, it represents the economic and subjective   
 engine of the modern-day economy. Debt creation, that is, the creation and   
 development of the power relation between creditors and debtors, has been   
 conceived and programmed as the strategic heart of neoliberal politics.    
 If debt is indeed central to understanding, and thus combating, neoliberalism,  
 it is because neoliberalism has, since its emergence, been founded on a logic   
 of debt.” Maurizio Lazzarato, The Making of the Indebted Man. An Essay on   
 the Neoliberal Condition, trans. Joshua David Jordan (Cambridge, MA: The MIT  
 Press, 2012), 25. In the language of Marx: It is unclear how the relations of   
 production, which are a part of the mode of production, can—at least under   
 present circumstances—be meaningfully analysed without taking into account   
 the ‘subjective engine’ of debt. 
3 Or a more liberal view in fact. For the abstraction from credit and debt is indeed  
 not limited to Marxian economics. 
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4 By speaking of ‘discourse’ I do not intend to refer to any elaborate notion of such  
 a thing, in particular not to a Foucauldian conception. Rather, I mean it in the   
 plain, good and old-fashioned way the English language has it: A discourse   
 is a speech. 
5 Cf. the statement that “Marx’s theoretical object is not England but the capitalist  
 mode of production in its ‘Kerngestalt’ and the determinations of  that    
 ‘Kerngestalt’.“ Louis Althusser and Étienne Balibar, Reading Capital (London:   
 NLB, 1970), 196. 
6 Alain Badiou made use of this term is relation to the disappearance of the Soviet  
 Union. We shall take the stance that the concept is of a more universal reach.   
 We shall not decide whether the obscure disaster Badiou names and the   
 potential for an obscure disaster today actually belong to one and the    
 same situation, or whether they instead form a prolonged greater problem.   
 We shall simply quote Badiou here to illustrate that our use of the term    
 remains faithful to the phenomenon he wishes to capture by it: “An abrupt   
 and complete change in a situation does not at all mean that the grace of   
 an event has happened to it.” Alain Badiou, “Of an Obscure Disaster,” Lacanian   
 Ink 22 (2003): 61. 
7 We have to be aware that Althusser and Badiou are essentially in conflict   
 concerning their notion of politics. Badiou has repeatedly criticized the ‘suture’  
 between philosophy and politics created by Althusser’s Marxism. As our   
 discourse makes clear, the separation of philosophy from politics, and hence   
 the return to philosophy itself, is likewise crucial to the entire argument we   
 are making. For it is on this separation that the distinction of prudence and duty  
 rests. 
8 Cf. History of Animals, 487b – 488a11, Aristotle, History of Animals, Books 1-3,   
 trans. A.L. Peck, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University   
 Press, 1965); Aristotle, History of Animals, Books 4-6, trans. A.L. Peck, Loeb   
 Classical Library (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970);    
 Aristotle, History of Animals, Books 7-10, trans. D.M. Balme, Loeb Classical Library  
 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991).Related is also the statement on  
 the original condition of man’s existence as ‘sporadic’ in the Politics, 1252b 23-24.  
 Cf. Aristotle, Politica, ed. William David Ross (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957). 
9 Cf. the statement by Averroes that “as for the human perfections, nothing of   
 them exists by nature save the dispositions alone or the beginnings leading   
 to their [sc., the perfections’] attainment. There is no sure sufficiency in nature   
 that these completions will reach us in their perfection; rather, they reach [us]   
 only through will and skilfulness. He who possesses this science also considers it  
 from this aspect—i.e., from the aspect that its efficient cause is choice and   
 will.“ Averroes, On Plato’s Republic, ed. Ralph Lerner (Ithaca ; London: Cornell   
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 University Press, 1974), 83. 
10 It is imperative to reconsider the view that for Aristotle ‘politics’ refers entirely   
 to a common work generated by natural causes of political animals. In fact there  
 is clear evidence that political order—and hence the nomoi, which define   
 the common work’s aim—might emerge for Aristotle either by chance or by art  
 exactly as much as they do by nature. One might attribute quite a similar view   
 to Machiavelli, who, in the Florentine Histories, clearly views political order   
 as governed by principles of natural movement and hence undergoing    
 natural genesis and corruption, and who nonetheless wrote the Prince as a book  
 on the principles of the artful founding of a new order by the co-occurrence of  
 virtú and occasione. 
11 It is noteworthy that Aristotle attributes to the nomos such a necessitating power  
 in book X.9 1180a 21f. of the Nicomachean Ethics. There he says: “the nomos does  
 have a necessitating power, it being logos that proceeds from a certain prudence  
 and thinking.” [My translation based on Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea, ed. Ingram  
 Bywater (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1894)] 
12 The term ‘glory’ has somewhat fallen out of fashion in political language. It   
 has a long tradition, of course, within theology, but is certainly not exclusively   
 limited to it. Recently Alain Badiou has used the term in an explicitly political   
 context in his expression of “the affirmative and glorious present of the    
 faithful subject.” Cf. Alain Badiou, Logic of Worlds. Being and Event, 2, trans.   
 Alberto Toscano (London ; New York: Continuum, 2009), 55. Giorgio    
 Agamben elaborated on the topic of glory in a particular chapter of his    
 major work The Kingdom and the Glory, cf. Giorgio Agamben, The Kingdom and  
 the Glory: For a Theological Genealogy of Economy and Government, trans.   
 Lorenzo Chiesa and Matteo Mandarini (Stanford: Stanford University Press,   
 2011). Both authors take an almost opposite stance on the question of glory. For  
 another example consider the occurrences of  the term ‘gloria’ in Machiavelli’s   
 Principe, In particular the statement in chapter XXVI, the exhortatio and end of  
 the entire book, cf. Niccolò Machiavelli, “Il Principe,” in Opere, ed. Corrado   
 Vivanti, vol. I (Torino: Einaudi-Gallimard, 1997), 190. 
13 Cf. Louis Althusser, On the Reproduction of Capitalism. Ideology and Ideological  
 State Apparatuses, trans. G.M. Goshgarian (London: Verso, 2014), 20ff. 
14 As we mentioned above: the incapability to decide on a specific object of   
 glorification is a fundamental weakness of critique, hence also of Marxism. 
15 The importance of Althusser’s notion of the ‘category of the subject’ is that 
particular names of the ‘subject’ are also used to address the subject as subject 
of a certain ideology. As citizen, or as worker, or as American, or as christian 
etc. To be a subject is therefore to be successfully addressed as subject by 
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such a concrete name. This is what Althusser terms the ‘functioning’ of the 
category of the subject. The category of the subject is therefore performative 
in the sense that it is true of an individual to be a subject of a specific ideology 
only if this individual as been successfully interpellated by the subject-name 
of that ideology. The greatest problem of Althusserian ideology theory is then 
to understand the becoming-of-subject-in-general for any individual, as there 
can be, strictly speaking, no beginning of the subject generally interpellated in 
Althusser’s theory. Cf. the classic essay Louis Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological 
State Apparatuses (Notes Twoards an Investigation),” in Lenin and Philosophy 
(London: NLB, 1971), 127–86. 
16 The category of ‘social’ insofar as it is predicated of ‘man’ is a central problem   
 not only for Marx. A very courageous and almost intrepid view on this    
 problem has been presented by Jean-Jacques Rousseau in his Discours sur   
 l’origine et le fondements de l’inégalité parmi les hommes. It is of course   
 also clear for all followers of Althusser that the concept of ‘society’, in particular  
 insofar as it is understood as a certain kind of totality, is highly problematic. Yet  
 Rousseau’s investigation goes much further than this. 
17 The first sentence of Capital reads as follows: “The wealth of societies in which   
 the capitalist mode of production prevails appears as an immense collection of  
 commodities; the individual commodity appears as its elementary form.”   
 It follows that ‘commodity’ is considered from the very beginning of the analysis  
 not as something independent, but rather related to the ‘capitalist mode of   
 production’ being ‘dominant’ in a given ‘society’. Karl Marx, Capital. A Critique of  
 Political Economy, ed. Ernest Mandel, trans. Ben Fowkes, vol. 1 (New York:   
 Penguin, 1976), 125. 
18 As is well known, the original plan of Capital in six volumes included an analysis  
 of these phenomena in a separate volume on the state. The whole enterprise was  
 of course never executed due to the monumental nature of the project. 
19 Marx’s statements on paper money and credit in the first volume of Capital   
 show a clear desire to minimize the importance of these phenomena for the sake  
 of his analysis. In particular he presupposes that an analysis of the ‘simple   
 circulation of commodities’ is possible under the abstraction of these categories.  
 Cf. Ibid., 1:224f. 
20 For a representative selection of some of these lesser known authors’ relevant 
publications, excluding Knapp’s State Theory of Money and Keynes’ Treatise 
on Money: Abba P. Lerner, “Money as a Creature of the State,” The American 
Economic Review 37, no. 2 (May 1, 1947): 312–17; Marc Lavoie, “The Endogenous 
Flow of Credit and the Post Keynesian Theory of Money,” Journal of Economic 
Issues 18, no. 3 (September 1, 1984): 771–97; Basil J. Moore, Horizontalists and 
Verticalists: The Macroeconomics of Credit Money (Cambridge England ; New 
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York: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Augusto Graziani, The Monetary Theory 
of Production (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Geoffrey K 
Ingham, The Nature of Money (Cambridge, UK; Malden, MA: Polity, 2004); L. 
Randall Wray, ed., Credit and State Theories of Money: The Contributions of A. 
Mitchell Innes (Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar, 2004); 
Michael Hudson and Cornelia Wunsch, eds., Creating Economic Order. Record-
Keeping, Standardization, and the Development of Accounting in the Ancient 
Near East (Bethesda, Maryland: CDL, 2004); Hyman P Minsky, John Maynard 
Keynes (New York; London: McGraw-Hill, 2008); David Graeber, Debt: The 
First 5,000 Years, (Melville House, 2011); Steve Keen, “Endogenous Money and 
Effective Demand,” Review of Keynesian Economics 2, no. 3 (July 2014): 271–91. 
21 Michael Heinrich, “Crisis Theory, the Law of the Tendency of the Profit Rate to   
 Fall, and Marx’s Studies in the 1870s,” Monthly Review 64, no. 11 (2015). 
22 Augusto Graziani, “The Marxist Theory of Money,” International Journal of Political  
 Economy 27, no. 2 (Summer 1997): 27. 
23 Messori already claimed in an article originally published in Italian in 1984 to 
have shown “that money (as capital) is not posited analytically by the process of 
commodity exchange, but that it is its premise. Logically, the first determination 
of money must therefore consists in its function as a means for the appropriation 
of the commodity labour power, that is, in its function as money capital.“ Money 
in this sense is primarily the purchasing power for the purchase of labour 
power, cf. Marcello Messori, “The Theory of Value Without Commodity Money?,” 
International Journal of Political Economy 27, no. 2 (Summer 1997): 81. Graziani 
elaborates on this by adding the consideration that money as purchasing power 
must be credit. 
24 Graziani, “The Marxist Theory of Money,” 31. 
25 Ibid., 32. 
26 The implicit premiss of Graziani’s argument is that all commodities are produced 
by such a process of production as outlined in the five-step scheme. One might 
attempt to deny this premiss and claim either one of two things: Either 1) that 
there is indeed already a money commodity in existence before the capitalist 
production process begin, which represents value in general. Or 2) that there 
are indeed commodities, which are not produced, but appropriated before the 
capitalist production process begins (i.e. the ‘means of production’). But then one 
has to explain how any of these two alternatives is compatible with the Marxian 
labour theory of value. How does the money commodity acquire the power to 
be exchanged for labour-power, and how do the means of production acquire 
that power, without themselves being produced by a process of commodity 
production? 
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27 In his later work he states explicitly that “the moment wages are paid, the firms  
 become debtors and the wage earners become creditors of the bank.“ Graziani,  
 The Monetary Theory of Production, 11. 
28 In the Chartalist literature on money, the origin of the demand for money issued 
by the state is itself created by the state through the imposition of a duty (fees, 
taxes, fines etc.). See for an example of a more intricate discussion Stephanie 
Bell, “The Role of the State and the Hierarchy of Money,” Cambridge Journal 
of Economics 25, no. 2 (2001): 149–163. Philosophically this is not satisfactory, 
as we now presuppose that we have an understanding of the state and, most 
importantly, of its origin. This of course reiterates a similar point made by 
Michael Heinrich: it appears impossible to understand the credit system without 
understanding its political presuppositions, i.e. the state. This is perhaps the most 
profound question. 
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